Theoretical and experimental insights on firms' internationalization decisions under uncertainty by Georgantzis, Nikolaos et al.
 
2012/41 
 
 
■ 
 
 
Theoretical and experimental insights on firms' 
internationalization decisions under uncertainty 
 
 
 
Nikolaos Georgantzis, Rafael Moner-Colonques 
Vicente Orts and José J. Sempere-Monerris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for Operations Research 
and Econometrics 
 
Voie du Roman Pays, 34 
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve 
Belgium 
http://www.uclouvain.be/core 
D I S C U S S I O N  P A P E R  
 
CORE DISCUSSION PAPER 
2012/41 
 
Theoretical and experimental insights on  
firms' internationalization decisions under uncertainty 
 
Nikolaos GEORGANTZIS 1, Rafael MONER-COLONQUES2  
Vicente ORTS3 and José J. SEMPERE-MONERRIS 4  
 
October 2012 
 
Abstract 
We revisit and extend previous theoretical work on internationalization decisions by firms which are imperfectly 
informed on the state of the demand in the market into which they are planning to export or enter through foreign 
direct investment (FDI). The latter is a costly strategy mitigating the international firm's demand uncertainty, 
while the local firm is perfectly informed. We report results from an experimental test of the aforementioned 
framework which confirm dominant strategy play by local firms under both the good and bad states of the local 
demand. Also, the prediction that the magnitude of the FDI-specific cost determines whether foreign firms enter 
via FDI is confirmed in qualitative terms. However, in the case in which FDI is the dominant strategy under risk 
neutrality, less than full FDI adoption is obtained. We also find an unexpected interaction between the 
internationalization decision and the market strategy once entry has occurred, indicating the presence of relevant 
behavioral and strategic factors which are not anticipated by the theoretical model. 
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1 Introduction
Uncertainty and variability are leading driving forces in rmsinternationalization strate-
gies. The sharp fall in transportation and trade costs world-wide, which would presumably
favor exports, contrasts with an increase in foreign direct investments (FDI), implying a
puzzling pattern to the arguments based on the received literature on multinationals1. In
this paper, we propose an explanation of a rms entry choice into a foreign market based
on the interplay between two factors, an external one depending on market uncertainty
and an internal one, the decision makers attitude towards risk. A rm is more likely to
prefer the FDI entry mode rather than to export, the higher the informational benets
from directly investing in and learning on the local market. Interestingly, the latter argu-
ment continues to hold even if rms are risk averse. In fact, rms with a more risk averse
attitude require a higher learning advantage to undertake FDI. We also report results
from an experiment accounting for subjects risk aversion largely conrming these con-
jectures. Furthermore, we nd some interesting behavioral patterns related to deviations
from dominant play in the market arising from strategic risk-related phenomena.
The literature on the multinational enterprise is extensive. The traditional view that
multinationals invest abroad due to the existence of specic advantages (ownership, lo-
cation and internalization framework, Dunning, 1981) has been challenged by alternative
specications built on the idea that rms become multinational to acquire knowledge
about foreign markets.2 In relation to this idea, the recent contribution by Albornoz et
al. (2012) provides evidence on the relevance of learning about foreign markets to explain
rmsexport dynamics. In Moner-Colonques et al. (2007), the foreign rm is placed at an
informational disadvantage relative to the host rm regarding host demand. It is shown
there that there is a strategic learning e¤ect associated with the FDI strategy. Thus,
FDI can be observed even in the absence of trade costs3. We complement this approach
assuming that the foreign rm planning to enter the market of uncertain demand is risk
1See Neary (2009), who o¤ers two possible resolutions to the paradox; one is based on the e¤ects of
intra-bloc trade liberalisation, while another explanation suggests that cross-border mergers are encouraged
by falling trade costs.
2Ethier and Markusen (1996) and Fosfuri and Motta (1999) investigate the rationale for FDI in terms of
technology-based arguments. In the context of multiproduct rms, Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) provide
an explanation to intra-industry FDI.
3The decision of a potential multinational in an uncertain environment has been examined by Saggi
(1998), and Rob and Vettas (2003), to mention a few. Although not in an international oligopoly context,
Comino (2006) studies the e¤ect of revealing information about market protability on rival rmsentry
decision. Horstmann and Markusen (1996) assume asymmetric information, in a game of mechanism design
to minimize agency costs. Herander and Kamp (2003) among others, examine the role of asymmetric cost
information in determining the foreign rms entry mode decision.
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averse.
Despite early insightful work and, more recent contributions4, the analysis of market
competition under behavioral considerations has received more skepticism than attention.
Asplund (2002) has presented a formal analysis of oligopolistic competition with risk-
averse rms, showing the e¤ect of risk preferences on rmsbest-response strategies and,
thus, on the intensity of competition. More related to our paper, Head et al. (2002)
emphasize the relevance of risk aversion in generating follow-the-leader behavior in FDI.
These authors study the incentives of a rm to relocate its production in the presence of
cost uncertainty. They show that a su¢ ciently risk-averse rm is more likely to establish
a manufacturing facility in a foreign country once its rivals have done so.
In this paper we develop a two-stage oligopoly game under demand uncertainty and
asymmetric information, where rst the foreign rm decides whether to serve the host
market through exports or direct investment and, then, it competes in quantities against
the informed host rm. Only when entry occurs through direct investment will the foreign
rm see uncertainty resolved: it learns whether the demand realization is the good state
or the bad state. We wish to study how the interplay between trade costs, the xed costs
of setting up a plant, market size, and in particular, the degree of risk aversion as well as
variability in demand, inuence the learning rationale for entry through direct investment.
The theoretical model is further tested in the lab.
As shall be seen, variability in demand favors the investment strategy absent risk
aversion. However, this may change when the foreign rm is risk averse. A su¢ ciently
high degree of risk aversion will turn variability in demand advantageous to the export
strategy. The question then arises, will the risk-averse foreign rm still have an incentive to
enter via investment and learn local demand characteristics? We will see that the answer
is positive, under some conditions. As noted above, risk aversion shapes the intensity of
competition. We argue that, when the foreign rm is su¢ ciently risk-averse, variability
in demand increases the expected utility of exports and decreases that of investment.
Entry via FDI requires that the probability of the good state of demand has to be large
enough (and larger than under risk neutrality); only then will it be able to cover the xed
setup costs. The validity of the learning argument can be appropriately tested with an
experiment, as suggested by Milgrom and Roberts (1987). However, to our knowledge,
such experimental study has not been undertaken so far in the context of an entry model
with informational asymmetries. While the relevance of behavioral factors for oligopolistic
markets has been recognized by a growing literature on experimental oligopolies, there is
4Representative pioneering papers include Baron (1970, 1971), Sandmo (1971), Leland (1971), Rubin-
stein (1976), Schmalensee (1989), Bresnahan (1989), Appelbaum and Katz (1986), Hviid (1989) and Kao
and Hughes (1993).
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almost no experimental work applying, extending or testing the theories of international
oligopoly in the lab. A couple of exceptions are the paper by Engelmann and Normann
(2007), on strategic trade policy and the paper by Riedl and van Winden (2011), on
taxation in an international context.
Our experimental design relates somehow to Oechssler and Schipper (2003), as it in-
volves subjects who are uncertain about the game they are playing. Their focus is on the
ability of subjects to learn the game they are playing in a repeated framework, while our
design allows subjects to invest in a costly strategy letting them know the game they are
playing with certainty. In this way, we implement in the lab the theoretical setup assum-
ing that FDI is a costly but uncertainty-reducing strategy, whereas exports involve lower
costs but a higher uncertainty concerning the demand conditions in the local market. In a
parallel experiment, we also elicit subjectsattitudes towards risk and use them to control
for the e¤ect of individual heterogeneity on market behavior.
Our ndings conrm the comparative statics prediction that rms are more likely to
invest in FDI (that is, to pay the cost of becoming informed), the lower the FDI-specic
cost. Dominant strategies are played by informed players in both states of the demand.
However, behavior by informed players in the good state of the demand unexpectedly
varies according to the cost of uninformed players to become informed. More cooperative
behavior is observed by informed players when such a cost is low. On the contrary,
uninformed players remaining uninformed behave less cooperatively under lower values of
the cost of becoming informed. Thus, the FDI-specic xed cost has an impact on the
intensity of competition following the entry mode choice.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3 we
describe the experimental design and discuss the results obtained. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
To illustrate our point, let us assume the following simple framework, based on Moner-
Colonques et al. (2007). There is a homogeneous goods industry with a local rm located
in host country h; that faces competition from a foreign rm. Inverse demand in the host
country is linear and stochastic as captured by the following inverse demand function;
~p = ~A Q; (1)
where ~p is the stochastic price, and Q is total output. The inverse demand intercept, ~A,
is a random variable that reects characteristics of the local economy and is distributed
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as follows:
~A =
(
a with probability 
a with probability 1  
; (2)
where a > a > 0 and therefore a is called the good state and a is the bad state. The
mean of ~A, denoted by a^(), is equal to a + (1   )a, and the variance, 2A, is equal to
(1  )(a  a)2: This distribution is known by both rms and is common knowledge.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, the value of ~A is realized and this is learned
by the host rm but remains unknown to the foreign rm. Then the following two-stage
game is played. In the rst stage, the foreign rm decides whether to export to the host
market (strategy e) or to invest and create a wholly owned subsidiary there (strategy i).
In the second stage, both the host and foreign rms compete in quantities. The rst-stage
decision has an informational implication: (i) in the event of investing, the foreign rm
will learn the realization of ~A, that is, it will play as an informed player in the second
stage, whereas (ii) if the foreign rm becomes an exporter, then its output choice in the
second stage will be made under uncertainty concerning the actual state of the demand.
For simplicity, the marginal cost of output is assumed to be zero. Under exporting,
the foreign rm supplies the host market at a constant marginal cost   0, where  is
the unit tari¤ and/or transportation cost. Alternatively, under the investment strategy,
the foreign rm bears a xed cost G  0, which includes any possible cost related with
the acquisition of information, and supplies the host market at a zero marginal cost.
We assume that rms are risk averse. In particular, rms maximize a weakly concave
function of own prots. We model risk attitudes by adopting a mean-variance framework.
Thus, a rm j prefers higher expected prots but dislikes prot variance. Then, when
deciding on the entry mode, its objective is to maximize the expected utility V (j) =
E[j ]   rjvar[j ], where E and var are the mean and variance operators, and rj > 0 is
the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion.
Before solving the model with incomplete information and risk averse rms, we begin
by looking at the certainty case. In so doing we will obtain some restrictions on the pa-
rameters. Suppose rst that  = 0, that is ~A = a. The foreign rms decision about how
to serve the host country consists of comparing the prots it would obtain as an exporter
e( ~A = a) =
(a 2)2
9 with those it would obtain under investing, i(
~A = a) = a
2
9  G: In
case the bad state realizes, we assume that internationalization occurs via exports, that is,
G > 4(a )9 . Suppose next that  = 1, that is ~A = a and that internationalization occurs
via investment when the good state realizes which implies that G < 4(a )9 . Furthermore,
it must the case that 0 < 2 < a < a, for positive equilibrium outputs and G < a
2
9
for positive prots under strategy i, i.e. no entry is disregarded. All these assumptions
together specify an interval for the xed set-up cost: 4(a )9 < G < minf4(a )9 ; a
2
9 g. It
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shows how the choice between exports and investment is inuenced by the relative costs of
these di¤erent modes of serving the host market; market size, as measured by the demand
intercept, also exerts an inuence on the foreign rms choice between e and i. The model
in the certainty case illustrates in a sense the traditional e¤ects of variables whose role is
well understood in the literature.
Analysis of Stage Two.
Two di¤erent scenarios can be reached depending on the rst stage choice by the
foreign rm.
a) If the foreign rm decides to invest in stage one, then the foreign and the host
rms will play a Cournot game under certainty since both rms know the realization of
demand. That is to say, if ~A = a, we have that qi (a) = q

hi(a) =
a
3 , whereas if
~A = a,
then qi (a) = q

hi(a) =
a
3 (star superscripts indicate equilibrium outputs and subscript h
distinguishes the host rm). Then, the ex ante expected payo¤s for the foreign rm are
given by:
Ei() =
a2 + (1  )a2
9
 G = a^()
2 + 2A
9
 G; (3)
whereas the ex ante expected variance of prots is equal to5
var[i] = (1  )(a
2   a2)2
81
=
2A(a+ a)
2
81
: (4)
Expected payo¤s increase with the mean but the variance of ~A a¤ects expected payo¤s and
the variance of prots in a di¤erent manner. We can therefore write down the expected
utility of strategy i as,
V (i()) = Ei()  rfvar[f ] (5)
=
a^()2
9
 G+ 
2
A
9

1  rf (a+ a)
2
9

;
where the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion enters linearly and negatively, and the overall
e¤ect of the variance is positive as long as rf < 9(a+a)2 . That is, a su¢ ciently low degree
of risk aversion implies that greater variability in demand increases the expected utility of
the investment strategy. However, as rf increases the variability in demand will end up
having a negative e¤ect on the expected utility. In fact, rf is bounded above to preclude
the possibility of having a negative V (i()):
b) In case the foreign rm decides to export, we have a game of incomplete infor-
mation on demand (with two types). The foreign rm maximizes V (e) and the host
5The variance of foreign rm prots can be easily computed by using var[j ] = E[(j   E[j ])2]; for
j = i; e.
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rm maximizes expected prots, where the expectations are taken with respect to all the
information available to each rm. Thus,
max
qe
V (e) = E[(a  qe   qhe(a)  )qe + (1  )(a  qe   qhe(a)  )qe] (6)
 rf(1  )q2e((a  a)  (qhe(a)  qhe(a))2;
max
qhe
E[( ~A  qe   qhe( ~A))qhe( ~A)] for ~A = a; a; (7)
where qe denotes the output of the foreign rm when it exports, and qhe denotes the
output of the host rm when it faces an exporter and is a function of the realization of
the demand intercept. The equilibrium output for the foreign rm is qe =
a^() 2
3+rf
2
A
; note
that @qe@rf < 0;
@qe
@2A
< 0 and @qe@a^() > 0: That is, the equilibrium output decreases with
the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion and the variance, and increases with the mean.
Finally, the equilibrium quantities for the host rm are: qhe(a) =
a(3+rf
2
A) a^()+2
2(3+rf
2
A)
and
qhe(a) =
a(3+rf
2
A) a^()+2
2(3+rf
2
A)
; where @q

hE(A)
@rf
> 0;
@qhE(A)
@2A
> 0 and @q

hE(A)
@a^() < 0 for A = a;
a: That is, the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion, the variance, and the mean have the
opposite e¤ect on the host rms equilibrium output as compared with the foreign rms
one. Furthermore, and concerning total output it is important to note that @q

e
@rf
+
@qhe(A)
@rf
<
0, @q

e
@2A
+
@qhe(A)
@2A
< 0 and @qe@a^()+
@qhe(A)
@a^() > 0; for A = a; a:
The expected prots are found to be equal to
Ee() =
2 + rf
2
A
2

a^()  2
3 + rf
2
A
2
=
2 + rf
2
A
2
(qe)
2 (8)
and these are decreasing both with the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion and the variance
of the demand intercept. The variance of prots is given by
var[e] =
2A
4

a^()  2
3 + rf
2
A
2
=
2A
4
(qe)
2 (9)
with the same properties regarding changes in rf and 2A: As before, we can compute the
expected utility of strategy e; which is given by
V (e()) =

1 +
rf
2
A
4

a^()  2
3 + rf
2
A
2
(10)
where it is worth noting that a positive sign of @V (e())=@rf depends on the follow-
ing condition relating the coe¢ cient of risk aversion and the variance of the demand
intercept, rf > 74 52A
: That is, a su¢ ciently high degree of risk aversion implies that
greater variability in demand increases the expected utility of the export strategy. Besides,
@V (e())=@
2
A is positive as long as rf <
a^() 2
42A
, which means that the variance of ~Amay
favor both internationalization strategies. And if it happens that 9
(a+a)2
< rf <
a^() 2
42A
;
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then variability in demand promotes entry through exports rather than through invest-
ment.
Analysis of Stage One:
The foreign rm will choose strategy i as long as V (i())  V (e()): The fact that
risk aversion and variability in demand may a¤ect both the investment and the export
strategies either di¤erently or in the same way motivates the analysis below.
To see the intuition, let us rst consider the risk-neutrality case rf = 0: Then, the
di¤erence in expected utilities reduces to
Ei()  Ee() jrf=0=
a^()2
9
 G+ 
2
A
9
  [a^()  2 ]
9
2
; (11)
and the foreign rm would decide to invest if
4(a^()  )
9| {z }
traditional e¤ect
+
2A
9|{z}
strategic learning e¤ect
 G (12)
This means that a setting with demand uncertainty and informational asymmetry provides
the foreign rm with an additional incentive to invest abroad: the strategic learning e¤ect.
This e¤ect is independent of trade costs  and supposes that greater variability in demand
favors the investment strategy. In fact, such possibility is present even if  were zero and
investment would be observed thus questioning the tari¤-jumping argument for FDI. We
should note that if the host rm were also uninformed about the demand intercept, that
is, in a game with uncertainty and no informational asymmetry, then the traditional e¤ect
would emerge alone and the variance of demand would play no role in the entry decision.
Solving (13) as an equality with respect to  denes a threshold value  such that for
 2 (0; ) entry occurs via exports and for  2 [; 1) entry occurs via FDI. The threshold
value for  is:
 =
(a  a+ 4) p(a  a)2 + 8(a+ a)  36G
2(a  a) :
Then we can characterize the payo¤s for both rms:
a) For  2 (0; ) internationalization occurs via exports. The foreign rms ex-
pected payo¤s are Ee() =
(a^() 2)2
9 : The host rms expected payo¤s are Ehe() =
(2(a+)+(a a^())2
36 :
b) For  2 [; 1) internationalization occurs via investment. The foreign rms
expected payo¤s are Ei() =
a2+(1 )a2
9   G: The host rms expected payo¤s are
hi() =
a2
9 :
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In order to intuitively understand the role of risk aversion on the aforementioned
threshold value of , we observe that the properties of (5) and (10) regarding the coe¢ cient
of absolute risk aversion and the variance of demand can make it such that variability in
demand discourages the FDI strategy. In fact, it can be shown that the di¤erence between
the expected utilities of the two alternative internationalization strategies decreases as risk
aversion does.6 Therefore we conclude that an increase in the foreign rms risk aversion
will require a higher premium to becoming informed in order for entry to be made via
FDI. That is, the probability of the high state of demand has to be greater in order for a
risk averse foreign rm to enter via FDI as compared to the case of risk neutrality.
3 Experimental Design and Results
A population of 48 subjects, recruited among undergraduate Economics students at Boc-
coni University (Milan, Italy) participated in 2 di¤erent sessions. The design is such that
each one of the subjects generates an independent observation for each one of the scenarios
in which they are asked to make decisions.
Game L Game R
ForeignLocal A B ForeignLocal A B
A (11; 11) (9; 10) A (18; 18) (15; 19)
B (10; 9) (8; 8) B (19; 15) (16; 16)
Table 1: Payo¤ matrices for the two games potentially played by the subjects depending
on the bad (L) or the good (R) state of the demand.
Table 1 displays the payo¤s corresponding to the two games implemented in order to
represent interaction between the local and the foreign rm in the local market. The game
on the left (L) corresponds to the bad state of demand and the game on the right (R)
to the good state. Observe that for a subject who knows the state of demand, A is the
dominant strategy in L and B is the dominant strategy in R.7 In terms of the theoretical
model, this is a simplication of the quantity-setting game in which rms choose their
quantity strategy in the local market from a continuum. In fact, A corresponds to a low
6Simulations have shown that the threshold probability is increasing in rf . Also, we can specify su¢ cient
conditions under which this happens. It requires that either  < 1
2
and rf  9(a+a)2 or that  > 12 and
rf  9(a+a)2 : These are su¢ cient conditions for the di¤erence V (i())   V (E()) to be increasing in 
(see the Appendix).
7When the probability of playing either game is 1=2 both strategies yield the same expected payo¤.
Also, risk averse subjects would choose A.
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output and B to a high one, yielding a prisonersdilemma in the good state of demand,
while the Nash equilibrium is Pareto dominant in the bad state.
Uninformed players have to submit a single strategy, A or B, without knowing whether
they are facing the good or the bad state, namely, whether they will be playing Game
L or Game R. However, they have a possibility to pay a xed amount, Ge in order
to become informed (corresponding to the FDI-related xed cost), thus, acquiring the
right to play di¤erent strategies across the two games. Two treatments, one with a low
(2.5e) and another with a high (5e) value of G, were implemented to test the hypothesis
resulting from the corresponding comparative statics of the theoretical model concerning
the internationalization stage of the game. It can be checked that risk neutral subjects
should always choose to spend G in order to become informed in the low-G treatment
and remain uninformed in the high-G treatment, but, as we will see below, risk neutrality
should not be taken for granted.
The experiment is implemented using the strategy method. Therefore, each subject
submitted a strategy both as a local and as a foreign rm. In the former of the two
cases, subjects submitted a strategy for each game under each scenario concerning their
foreign rivals information (informed/uninformed). In the case in which they were playing
as a foreign rm they submitted a single strategy for both games under the scenario
of being uninformed and two strategies, one for each game, under the scenario of being
uninformed. Finally, when playing as foreign rms, they decided whether to enter into
the foreign market using FDI or through exports for each one of the two values of FDI-
associated extra xed cost, G. Once their strategies were submitted to the experimenter,
the role of a foreign rm was randomly assigned to half of them and the role of a local rm
to the other half. Then each subjects decision in the scenarios chosen was implemented
for each pair of rivals to determine the nal payo¤s for each one of them.
In a previous stage, subjects participated in an experiment designed to elicit their
preferences towards risk. Two risk-elicitation tasks were implemented, one introduced
in Holt and Laury (2002) and the other in Sabater-Grande and Georgantzís (2002). The
former is a broadly used test designed to classify subjects according to the intensity of their
aversion or attraction to risky choices. The latter is designed to measure the degree of risk
aversion, making no distinction between risk loving and risk neutral behavior. However,
it captures variation of choices in response to variations in the risk premia, avoiding the
usual error of deducing a subjects utility function from a single point of it8. There is an
increasing number of experimental studies eliciting risk attitudes in an independent task
8A very detailed account of the advantages and mostly the bi-dimensionality of the Sabater and Geor-
gantzís (2002) lottery-panel task is provided in García-Gallego et al. (2012).
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from the main experiment whose data are potentially explained by subjectsrisk attitudes,
although few of them report9 strongly positive results. In this paper, the data from the
two aforementioned risk tests presented a low but signicant correlation to each other
(r = 0:26).
From the model in Section 2, the following hypotheses can be established and checked
experimentally:
H1 : Local rms will play the dominant strategy in the market game regardless of the
foreign rms strategies.
H2 : (1) Informed foreign rms will play the dominant strategy in the market game.
(2) Uninformed foreign rms are more likely to play A the more risk averse they
are.
H3 : For any risk attitude an increase in G implies less observed information purchase.
H4 : For any probability of the good state of demand foreign rms are more likely to
purchase information the more risk averse they are.
Percentage of A strategies Initially Informed playing with (if) Finally Uninformed
under each condition Informed (Uninformed) rival Informed
Treatments Game L Game R Game L Game R Both
Low G treatment 95.8% 16.6% 95.8% 20% 41%
(33.3% buy info) (95.8%) (4%)
High G treatment 95.8% 8% 95.8% 12% 79%
(0% buy info) (100%) (4%)
Table 2: Percentage of subjects playing strategy A under each condition.
Table 2 reports the percentage of subjects playing strategy A. The second column
corresponds to the play of an initially informed subject (equivalent to a local rm in our
model) playing against an informed rival (a foreign rm adopting FDI). The percentages in
parentheses refer to the play of an initially informed subject playing against an uninformed
rival (a foreign exporter). Column three reports the data of a subject who purchased the
information (a foreign rm adopting FDI), whereas column four reports those for an
uninformed subject (a foreign exporter). Rows distinguish the two treatments
The main results coming out from the experiment can be summarized as follows:
Result 1: The prediction of dominant play (strategy A) by initially informed players
(local rms) and ex post informed ones (foreign rms adopting FDI) in Game L (bad state
9For example, Sabater-Grande and Georgantzís (2002) nd that when appropriately accounting for risk
aversion, behavior in both a probabilistic and a deterministic version of a prisonersdilemma depends on
subjectsrisk aversion.
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of the demand) receives strong support (over 95%) in all cases.
Result 2: The prediction of dominant play (strategy B) by initially informed players
(local rms) in Game R (good state of the demand) playing against uninformed rivals
(exporters) receives strong support (only 4% play against this prediction).
These results provide full support to hypotheses H1 and H2(1).
We also obtain the following results:
Result 3: No subject has used FDI in the high-G treatment and 30% of them have
done so in the low-G one.
This result qualitatively conrms H3. In fact, the rst part of the result fully conrms
the theoretical prediction for the low value of G under risk neutrality. On the contrary, the
second part of the result contradicts the prediction of global adoption of FDI. As indicated
by our theoretical framework, this is compatible with risk averse behavior. Indeed, the
subjects who have not purchased information in the low-G treatment have exhibited a
weakly (Mann-Whitney, p=0.1) higher degree of risk aversion in the Sabater-Grande and
Georgantzís (2002) risk elicitation task. This is in accordance to H4.
The experiment also delivers the following results which are related to behavioral issues
not captured by the theoretical framework.
Result 4: Unexpectedly, initially informed players (local rms) signicantly vary
across treatments the frequency of their cooperative play against informed entrants (foreign
rms adopting FDI) in Game R (good state of the demand), depending on the value of
G. Specically, in the low-G treatment they abandon the dominant strategy B, in favor
of cooperative market behavior in almost twice as many cases as they do in the high-G
treatment (16.6% vs. 8%).
This nding may be a consequence of the following result.
Result 5: Unexpectedly, initially uninformed players (foreign rms) who have decided
to become informed (adopting FDI) behave di¤erently in Game R (good state of the de-
mand) under di¤erent values of G (FDI-related cost). Specically, having to pay a lower
G in order to adopt FDI makes them play cooperatively almost twice as frequently than
when having to pay a high G (20% vs. 12%).
Results 4 and 5 imply an unexpected, although intuitively plausible pattern of behavior.
Foreign rms who have adopted FDI in the low-G treatment behave in a way which
is straightforward to interpret. Their strategy is compatible with rational, risk neutral
behavior. Following FDI adoption, they should be expected to have higher target earnings,
leading them to behave more cooperatively in the foreign market than they would do
otherwise. This is conrmed by their strategies and may be also the driving force behind
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Result 4. On the contrary, rms who would adopt FDI in the high-G treatment10 behave in
a way which is not easy to interpret without assuming some kind of extreme risk aversion.
From Sabater-Grande and Georgantzís (2002), we know that highly risk averse subjects
tend to behave less cooperatively in a prisonersdilemma. This is also conrmed by our
data, given that subjects whose risk aversion ranks them in the lowest quartile of our
sample cooperate signicantly more in all scenarios and local rms seem to anticipate
this variation in their rivalsbehavior depending on the value of G paid by foreign rms
adopting FDI.
Finally, we need to look at the behavior of initially uninformed players who choose to
remain uninformed.
Result 6: Unexpectedly, the behavior of initially uninformed players (foreign rms)
who have decided to remain uninformed (exporters) signicantly varies under di¤erent
values of G. Specically, a lower G (FDI-related cost) makes an exporting rm behave
signicantly less cooperatively than under a higher one (41% vs. 79%).
That is, when rms have decided to enter as exporting sellers into the foreign market,
they behave less cooperatively when their decision to export has been taken in a setup
which is more favorable to FDI. While the theoretical setup is agnostic to the beliefs of
subjects concerning their rivalsintentions to compete or collude in the foreign market, our
experimental data reveal the importance of these issues in the presence of human decision
makers.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a model where a risk-averse foreign rm decides its entry mode in
a local market. Entry via FDI entails learning about local demand. It has been shown that
the foreign risk-averse rm will undertake FDI rather than export when the probability
of the good realization of demand is high enough.
We have tested the predictions of the learning argument under market uncertainty and
risk aversion in a lab experiment. Our results conrm the main testable hypotheses, but
some unpredicted interesting behavioral patterns have also been found. First, initially
informed subjects play (almost with certainty, 95%) the dominant strategy A in Game L
(the bad state of the demand), independently of foreign rms informational condition.
On the contrary, dominant play, strategy B, in Game R (the good state of the demand) by
informed players becomes more likely in the presence of an uninformed rival. Uninformed
players also play (95%) strategy A in Game L when they become informed. But ex post
10Actually no subject does so, but the strategy method used makes available those data by eliciting
subjectsstrategies under all possible scenarios.
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informed players are signicantly more likely (20% vs. 12%) to play cooperatively also in
Game R if the cost of becoming informed is lower. When uninformed players choose to
remain so, the percentage of A play also unexpectedly varies across treatments (increasing
from 41% to 79% as we move from the low-G to the high-G treatment), but in the opposite
direction to that reported on nally informed subjects. Only 1/3 of the subjects in the
low information cost treatment buy information (against 100% predicted) and nobody in
the high information cost treatment buys information, as predicted.
Therefore, we conrm the basic comparative static prediction of the model on the
role of FDI-related costs on the adoption of it as opposed to exports to the same foreign
country. Furthermore, we nd that the conditions determining whether FDI will or will
not be adopted also a¤ect the behavior of rms with respect to their posterior behavior
in the foreign market. Depending on the extra costs associated with the FDI strategy,
exporting rms will behave more or less cooperatively in the foreign market. Having
chosen to export when FDI is the rational strategy for risk neutral players makes a foreign
rm adopt more competitive behavior in the foreign market. The opposite happens if
entry is via FDI. A possible explanation is o¤ered when subjectsrisk aversion is taken
into account, with highly risk averse subjects behaving in a signicantly more cooperative
manner. Surprisingly, our initially informed subjects seem to have predicted this pattern
by playing more cooperatively when playing against FDI-adopting rms under conditions
favoring FDI adoption than when playing against FDI-adopting rms under conditions
favoring exports.
This paper illustrates once more the fact that decisions made by human subjects are
the result of many more features than those usually assumed by theorists. Two ongoing de-
bates on behavioral industrial organization carry over intact to international trade settings
like the one studied here: First, whether mainstream models survive as good predictors of
observed market behavior, despite the uncontrolled idiosyncratic features of human nature.
Here, the main comparative statics of the theoretical model and equilibrium play in vari-
ous subgames are supported by our experimental results, whereas some further interesting
behavioral patterns have been identied which could be used to extend the framework.
Second, whether the aforementioned idiosyncratic features can be identied in real world
data and whether, if relevant, we need to incorporate them into the theoretical models to
signicantly improve our view of the world. This second question is under investigation in
many di¤erent forums and sub-disciplines of economics. International Economics should
not stay out of the debate.
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A Appendix: Instructions to the subjects*
*Translation from the original in Italian.
You are going to participate in an experiment nanced with public funds. Your deci-
sions will determine your monetary reward at the end of the session. If you have questions
after reading these instructions, please raise your hand.
You will have to submit your strategies, A or B, in the following situation: Two players,
an informed (I) and an initially un-informed (U) one, play one of the two games, Left (L)
and Right (R) whose payo¤s are dened as in Table 1 (payo¤s in Euros). The game
is played by I-U pairs. If you are an I-type player (given that you know which game you
are playing when submitting your strategy) you can submit two (potentially di¤erent)
strategies, one for each game. If you are a U-type player (given that you do not know
which game you will be actually playing at the moment of submitting your strategy) you
are obliged to submit one strategy for both games. U players may become informed by
paying an amount X, which may take two values, X = 2:5 e and X = 5:0 e. This means
that if you decide to become informed you can submit d¤erent strategies for di¤erent
games. The initially informed player (I) will know whether you became informed or not.
Before you know which type of player you are (I or U), and, if you are I, which game you
play, and, if you are U-type, the actual value of X, you will have to submit your strategy
for each condition and role.
Once we collect your strategies under all possible scenarios, a random process will
determine your role and you will be matched with a player (whose identity will not be
revealed to you) of the other type. A random process will also determine the actual game
and the scenario regarding the value of X. Your decisions and those of the other player
under these conditions will be used to determine your nal reward.
Use the following page to submit your strategies. When you nish, wait until one of
the experimenters collects the strategy-submission sheets. Soon after that, you will be
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informed on the actual scenario and your reward in the experiments.
Thank you for participating!
Submit your strategy (subject ID___________):
If you are an I-type player and play against a U-type who remained uninformed under
the X = 2:5e scenario:
In game L, my strategy is ______________(A or B)
In game R, my strategy is ______________(A or B)
If you are an I-type player and play against a U-type who became informed under the
X = 2:5e scenario:
In game L, my strategy is ______________(A or B)
In game R, my strategy is ______________(A or B)
If you are an I-type player and play against a U-type who remained uninformed under
the X = 5:0e scenario:
In game L, my strategy is ______________(A or B)
In game R, my strategy is ______________(A or B)
If you are an I-type player and play against a U-type who became informed under the
X = 5:0e scenario:
In game L, my strategy is ______________(A or B)
In game R, my strategy is ______________(A or B)
If you are a U-type player and did not become informed under the X = 2:5e scenario:
In both games, my strategy is _____________(A or B)
If you are a U-type player and did not become informed under the X = 5:0e scenario:
In both games, my strategy is _____________(A or B)
If you are a U-type player and you chose to become informed under the X = 2:5e
scenario:
In game L, my strategy is ______________(A or B)
In game R, my strategy is ______________(A or B)
If you are a U-type player and you chose to become informed under the X = 5:0e
scenario:
In game L, my strategy is ______________(A or B)
In game R, my strategy is ______________(A or B)
If you are a U-type player, do you choose to become informed...
...if the cost X of becoming informed is 2:5e? __________(Yesor No)
...if the cost X of becoming informed is 5:0e? __________(Yesor No).
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B Appendix: Proof of the statement in footnote 6
The next equality V (i())  V (e()) = 0 implicitly denes the threshold ; denoted
by ; such that for a greater probability of the good state of demand the foreign rm opts
for the FDI option. Therefore an implicit function is dened that relates the threshold
and the other parameters. We are interested in how  varies as rf does. That is, we want
to know the sign of the following derivative:
d
drf
=  
@(V (i()) V (e()))
@rf
@(V (i()) V (e()))
@
First, it is easy to check that @(V (i()) V (e()))@rf =  
1
81(a+a)
22A+
2A(5+rf
2
A)(a^() 2)2
4(3+rf
2
A)
3 <
0 for all rf . Note that the derivative of
@(V (i()) V (e()))
@rf
with respect to rf is negative
and that @(V (i()) V (e()))@rf evaluated at rf = 0 is negative.
Next note that @(V (i()) V (e()))@ =
@(V (i()) V (e()))
@2A
d2A
d +
@(V (i()) V (e()))
@a^()
@a^()
@
, where @a^()@ > 0 while
d2A
d > 0 i¤  <
1
2 : Also note that
@(V (i()) V (e()))
@2A
> 0 i¤
rf <
9
(a a)2 ; while
@(V (i()) V (e()))
@a^() > 0 for all rf (just noting that
@(V (i()) V (e()))
@a^() =
2a^()
9  
(4+rf
2
A)(a^() 2)
2(3+rf
2
A)
2 ; which is increasing in rf and it is positive when it is evaluated at
rf = 0): Therefore the su¢ cient conditions are that
d2A
d and
@(V (i()) V (e()))
@2A
be either
both positive or both negative.
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